Analysts are sometimes asked to make frequency estimates for specific accidents in which the accident frequency is determined primarily by safety controls. Under these conditions, frequency estimates use considerable expert belief in determining how the controls affect the accident frequency. To evaluate and document beliefs about control effectiveness, we have modified a traditional Bayesian approach by using approximate reasoning (AR)' to develop prior distributions. Our method produces accident frequency estimates that separately express the probabilistic results produced in Bayesian analysis and possibilistic results that reflect uncertainty about the prior estimates.Based on our experience using traditional methods, we feel that the AR approach better documents beliefs about the effectiveness of controls than if the beliefs are buried in Bayesian prior distributions. We have performed numerous expert elicitations in which probabilistic information was sought from subject matter experts not trained in probability. We find it much easier to elicit the linguistic variables and fuzzy set membership values used in AR than to obtain the probability distributions used in prior distributions directly from these experts because it better captures their beliefs and better expresses their uncertainties.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we present a method for generating Bayesian prior distributions of a Poisson parameter using approximate reasoning (AR). In this method, the uncertainty introduced in generating the prior distribution is explicitly represented by fuzzy set memberships interpreted as a possibilistic measure of 'For a good survey of this field see Ramon Lopez de Mantaras, Approximate Reasoning Models, Ellis Horwood Series in Artificial Intelligence, Ellis Howrood LTD, 1990. belief.2 This method was developed specifically for estimating accident frequencies for military weapon systems in which great reliance is placed on controls to reduce the accident frequency from relatively high to acceptable levels. This approach is useful when there is a lack of "hard" data, but there is a wealth of anecdotal or experiential knowledge. Such a situation arises when experience on a specific weapon system is limited, but more general weapon system experience with safety controls is applicable.
This problem can be approached probabilistically using Bayesian statistical analysis.3 To review this concept briefly, subjective estimates of the Poisson parameter called prior distributions are "updated" using available operating data to produce an updated estimate of the parameter. When there is little operating experience or useful surrogate data, the prior distribution can dominate the results. Such prior distributions often are generated using expert judgement that is difficult to document, and the original justification may be lost. In the work reported here, we use Bayesian methods to include nonstatistical knowledge about the effect of safety controls on accident frequency. An important innovation is the use of the mathematical tools of AR to capture the knowledge base and reasoning used by experts in constructing prior distributions. This approach provides a rigorous, reproducible, and traceable basis for the prior distributions. It also provides a means for explicitly indicating uncertainty about the prior distribution using possibility as an uncertainty measure. In a typical Bayesian analysis, the uncertainty about the prior distribution is folded into the distribution itself, a practice that tends to obscure the issues involved in generating the prior distribution. In our method, this source of uncertainty is treated separately and differently from probabilistic uncertainty *D. Dubois and H. Prade, Possibility Theory, Plenum Press, 1988. by interpreting fuzzy set memberships a as a measure of the expert's uncertainty in generating prior distributions.
A schematic overview of our approach is shown in Fig. 1 . In this paper, we focus mainly on evaluating controls, generating prior distributions, and generating occurrence probability estimates. The logical decomposition of an event into causal sequences is a critical aspect of our analysis because it allows experts to consider individual sequences leading to an accident one at a time. This simplification is necessary in identifying the controls used to prevent an accident and in determining their effectiveness. We do not discuss this important part of the analysis here but refer the reader to other discussion of this subject.4 We also do not discuss Bayesian analysis in detail because this technique is familiar to practitioners of reliability and probabilistic safety analysis. We will spend the majority of this paper describing the AR evaluation of control effectiveness and translating this evaluation into the h prior distributions. We also will show how the possibilistic measures of uncertainty introduced by the AR analysis are propagated to the occurrence probability estimates. These measures of uncertainty capture the expert's beliefs about the effectiveness of the controls used to reduce accident frequency. 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE DEFINITION
The technique shown in this paper is nearly impossible to follow without an example. The actual problems for which we developed and applied this technique are classified, so we are unable to discuss either the accident sequences or the numerical results in an open forum. However, the example that we use to illustrate our method captures the important characteristics of the actual applications.
We are interested in estimating the probability of occurrence of a particular accident state for a weapon system during a time period 7. We assume that the occurrence can result from any of four independent sequences of events. Each sequence n can be modeled as a Poisson process with a constant occurrence rate 1 , . For simplicity, we assume that no occurrences of the event have happened but presume considerable qualitative knowledge about the controls used to reduce the frequencies of the various sequences leading to the accident conditions.
Controls for the four accident sequences are summarized and evaluated in Tablel. In an actual application, the controls would be identified and evaluated by weapon system experts. These evaluations use an agreed-upon set of linguistic descriptors for control effectiveness, in this case {Highly, Quite, Partially, Ineffective). This set of descriptors is called a Universe of Discourse (UOD). These descriptors are defined in Table 2 .
USING THE CONTROLS TO ESTIMATE h PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
The evaluation of the effectiveness of controls forms the basis of our estimation of the h priors for a Bayesian analysis. We are going to treat these effectiveness descriptors as linguistic variables and fuzzy subsets of the UOD. Our next step is to translate the qualitative descriptions of Table 1 into fuzzy set membership vectors. This translation is called set assignment and introduces set assignment uncertainty. A fuzzy set membership vector shows the set membership values for each of the fuzzy subsets for control effectiveness in the order: {Highly, Quite, Partially, Ineffective}. For example, a vector representing membership of .5 in Highly and .5 in Quite, with no membership in Partially or Ineffective would be (.5,.5,0,0). The mapping from the qualitative descriptions to the membership vectors relies on the judgment of the analyst, but we have found it helpful to provide the set of guidelines shown in Table 3 .
Following these guidelines, the qualitative descriptions of Table 1 translate into the fuzzy set membership vectors shown in Table 4 . These fuzzy set Belief that value is exclusively in one set Strong belief that value is in one set, but some belief that another set may also be appropriate Equal belief that the value is in any of n sets One set is favored, but another has significant support as well Table 4 Control Effectiveness Fuzzy Set Membership Vectors membership values will be interpreted as expressing the expert's belief in which prior estimates for I to use for each sequence. The greater the fuzzy set membership, the greater the expert's belief that a given effectiveness is appropriate for a set of controls.
In our example, two controls, 3.1 and 3.2, are used to reduce the accident frequency for sequence 3. To apply our method in such a situation, the analysts evaluate the aggregate effectiveness of the control suite using a rule base.5 An example of such a rule base is shown in Table 5 , This rule base accepts control effectiveness descriptors for two controls and outputs the effectiveness of the combination using the same linguistic descriptors as the input. The rule base shown here is used commonly in our analysis and represents a slight bias toward conservatism in combining controls. This bias is seen in the result for two partially effective controls. Two partially effective controls result in a partially effective aggregate control. This rule prevents stringing together a series of mediocre controls and claiming that the result is Highly effective.
The operation of this rule base is illustrated by evaluating the effectiveness of controls 3.1 and 3.2. Control 3.1 has an effectiveness described by the set membership vector (0.7,0.3,0,0] and 3.2 has (0,0.5,0.5,0). Recall that the first position in the vector is for Highly, the second is for Quite, the third is for Partially, and the fourth is for Ineffective. The Cartesian product of the membership vectors for controls 3.1 and 3.2 generates all the combinations of control effectiveness that have nonzero memberships in both controls. The pairs of effectiveness descriptors that we have to consider are (Highly, Quite), (Highly, Partially), (Quite, Partially), and (Quite, Quite). Our notation is that the first value is from control 3.1, and the second is from 3.2. As an example, according to the rule base Highly and Quite effective controls combine to produce a Highly effective aggregate. The inferences of interest in our example are shown by highlighting the appropriate items in the rule base. Note that three of the pairs result in an output of Highly.
The control effectiveness descriptors are fuzzy sets and have memberships associated with them. We need some way to generate the membership value of the output effectiveness descriptors from the membership values of the inputs. The membership value for the resultant arising from a pair of inputs is found by taking the minimum of the memberships values for the pair. This works fine when there is only one pair of inputs 5T. F. Bott, "An Approach to Evaluating the Effectiveness of Safety Controls," Los Alamos National Laboratory report LA- UR-98-4953 (1998) . that results in a given output. However, in our case, there are three pairs of input that lead to the same output, namely, Highly. In this case, the membership of the output is found using the Max-Min formula.6 This formula is succinctly stated as In this formula, tin and am are elements n and m of fuzzy input membership vectors ti and a and !R is a particular element output by the rule. To find the membership for Vl , one first finds the minimum membership in either ti or a for every pair that result in Vl. The membership value of the resultant 3 is then the maximum value over all pairs of the inputs K and a that result in Vl.
An example using the rule base of Table 5 and the membership values for controls 3.1 and 3.2 is shown in Table 6 . Using the Max-Min formula, the resultant membership vector has values (.5,.3,0,0], indicating a stronger belief in Highly than in Quite and no belief in Partially or Ineffective.
The final complication in our example is sequence 4. In this sequence, there are no controls, but the sequence frequency has a relatively low inherent frequency. In some sequences, constraints or other factors not normally considered controls may dictate the frequency of the sequence. We often encounter sequences whose frequencies are dictated primarily by the occurrence of external initiating events such as lightning. The effect of the relative rarity of lightning strikes on the system may be treated as if it were a control, and can even be combined with other controls. As we shall demonstrate later, the sequence 4 inherent frequency of about 104 per year corresponds to a control with that has full membership in Quite effective.
BAYES PRIOR ESTIMATE FOR POISSON PARAMETERS
As stated above, we have assumed that the occurrence of each sequence can be described using a Poisson process with the occurrence times distributed exponentially according to a Poisson parameter h, for sequence n. To use a Bayesian estimation process, we make an initial or prior estimate for each h using existing knowledge about each sequence and then modify that prior estimate using occurrence data derived from operational experience. In this example, we assume that
6T. J. Ross, Fuzzy Logic with Engineering Applications,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995. we can assign h to intervals. The prior estimates are assumed to be uniform distributions over these intervals. Although the assumption of a uniform distribution is not necessary to use this AR approach, we feel that such a choice generally will be appropriate to the level of knowledge we are assuming in using this method. If enough knowledge exists to make more detailed prior estimates, then the AR approach probably does not use all the available information efficiently.
Using a uniform prior distribution for hon the interval [h2.hl] and no occurrences during a time T, a Bayes formula produces a posterior distribution for h given by Statistics for h can be generated from this distribution. For example, the mean h for a given distribution g is given by
Similarly, they probability value for h is given by a, = -T Although Eq. (4) formally represents a probability interval for h, we will refer to it as the yth percentile. These formulae are applicable to each sequence leading to the accident conditions. The formulae will depend only on which h interval is chosen as a prior.
BAYES PRIOR ESTIMATES VIEWED AS FUZZY SET ASSIGNMENTS
To translate control effectiveness into h intervals, we define a set of intervals on the real line that correspond to the definitions for each effectiveness descriptor in Table 2 . For simplicity, we wish to have a one-to-one mapping between h intervals and effectiveness descriptors. Thus, each effectiveness will map into a single h interval. We typically base our definitions on the probability of one or more accident events occurring during a time period t given a particular h. This probability is found from (5) We use the system design lifetime for the value t-in our example about 20 yr. In the systems we have examined, 2002 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Syniposiuni most accident sequences would be expected to have a relatively high probability of occurrence during the design lifetime in the absence of controls. To capture this, we define the lower bound of our highest hestimate interval, L, at about .03 so that the probability of occurrence in the design life is P = 0.5. This definition also fixes the upper bound of our second highest interval, I,.
A highly effective control "virtually eliminates" an accident sequence. We consider an accident sequence as being virtually eliminated if the probability of occurrence during design lifetime is less than about 10-3. This sets the upper bound of our lowest interval 11 at about 3 x 10-5/yr. We choose the upper limits on the remaining interval, 1% corresponding to a quite effective control as ,003, 2 orders of magnitude higher than the 11 upper bound and an order of magnitude below the 13 upper bound. The results of the analysis are insensitive to the lower limit on the intervals I1 to 13 as long as the interval covers a decade or more. Therefore, we typically choose the lower bound for the lowest interval as lo6. This set of intervals and the mapping from the effectiveness descriptors to the intervals is shown in Fig. 2 .
This mapping emulates how an expert perceives control effectiveness affecting an initial estimate of h in the interval Ia. A control that is ineffective leaves h in the L interval. A partially effective control moves h to 13, Quite effective moves it to Iz and Highly effective moves it to 11.
The one-to-one mapping between control effectiveness and h intervals means that the control effectiveness fuzzy membership values can be assigned one-to-one to h intervals. We interpret these fuzzy set membership assignments for a h interval as indicating Mapping from Control Effectiveness Fuzzy  Fig. 2. Subsets to Ir. Intervals. our belief that a given h interval is the appropriate one to represent the accident-sequence frequency, when the controls are taken into account.
Recall that each of the intervals 11 through 14 is a uniform distribution for 1 and can be used in Eq. (2) to generate a posterior h distribution. Each of these h distributions can be used to generate h statistics, which we then use to generate probabilities of occurrence using Eq. (5). In Table 7 , we summarize the mean h, 90th percentile h, and the probabilities of occurrence for a 20-yr design lifetime that are generated by the different h intervals.
To illustrate, consider sequence 2 of our example. The control effectiveness membership vector is (.7,.3,0,0).
We interpret this to mean that we have a relative belief value .7 that h4 is in 11, .3 that it is in 1% and 0 that it is in 12 or 13. This meam that we have the relative belief that mean h is 1.5 x lo5 and PSzl is 3 x 10-1. Similarly, we have a belief value of 0.3 that the mean h is 1.5 x lo3 and P,I is 3 x 10-2.
The result then cames both the uncertainty associated with the h prior estimate (represented by a uniform distribution over an interval) and uncertainty on assigning a h prior interval by means of control effectiveness evaluation. The former uncertainty is expressed by the g(hl0) distribution, and the latter is expressed by the fuzzy subset memberships (interpreted as belief) associated with the g(h IO) distribution.
INTERPRETING THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE RESULTS
Some representative probability of occurrence results for our example are shown in Table 8 . The upper bound uses the mean h from the posterior distribution generated by the highest h interval with non-zero set membership. The lower bound is the result of using the h. posterior distribution generated by the lowest h interval with non-zero set membership. When only an upper bound is given, only one of the h intervals has non-zero set membership. The best estimate is found by: 
In Table 5 , sequence 2 exercises rule 0 and sequence 3 with control 3.2 only exercises rule 0 . The probability of one or more Occurrences from any of n sequences is found from the formula This is easily and rapidly computed using a Monte Carlo or other sampling simulation.
One potential drawback to this approach is the added complexity of the results. Our accident frequency estimates include both the Bayesian distribution and fuzzy set memberships interpreted as possibilities or beliefs. Potential users of safety results often wish to get a single, bottom-line answer, not a proliferation of uncertainty measures. We have addressed this by explaining the interaction of the beliefs and the statistics. For example, we describe the results of Table 8 as showing that we are quite certain that the probability of occurrence for sequence 2 is less than .03 and that the average is .0003 or less. This has mollified our sponsors to some extent, but we feel that better methods of communicating the results are needed. 
